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Executive Summary
After much debate and many legislative proposals, the Clean Air Act was amended in
1990 to allow more flexibility in meeting emissions standards for SO2. Specifically, an SO2
emissions allowance trading program was implemented.  Firms can meet emission standards by
any pollution control method, including buying emission allowances from other firms. Analysts
have concluded that, with the changes in the Clean Air Act, SO2 emissions have been reduced by
50 percent and at an estimated $7 billion less than the anticipated cost of the regulatory
command-and-control system.
Not surprisingly, policy analysts have explored the opportunities for implementing similar
market-based systems for water pollution control.  Because much of the on-going impairment of
surface water has been attributed to nonpoint sources of pollution, trading programs which
incorporate both point and nonpoint discharges are of particular interest.  However, despite as
many as six efforts across the nation to implement point-nonpoint effluent credit trading programs
to reduce nutrient discharges to water, there have been few trades to date.
This research was undertaken to answer the following question: Do current barriers to
effluent credit trading programs arise because of fundamental differences between air and water
media or because of differences between institutions affecting air and water use, such as the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act? 
Economic theory offers the situation, structure, conduct, and performance (SSCP)
framework, developed by industrial organization economists and extended by institutional and
environmental economists, within which to address this research question.  In the language of the
SSCP framework, the research question can be reframed as: are there fundamental differences in
the situation and structure of emission allowance markets and effluent credit markets which result
in conduct and performance differences?A comparative analysis of situation and structure suggests that barriers to effective
nutrient discharge credit markets are not a result of fundamental differences in the air and water
media or the materials being discharged into air and water.  Rather, the barriers exist because of
structural differences – differences in institutional structure, program design and program
implementation.  Many of the structural barriers result from the Clean Water Act and its
implementation.  More flexibility in water pollution prevention would effectively remove many of
these barriers.
This research was supported, in part, by a grant from the Office of the Great Lakes,
Michigan Great Lakes Protection Fund and by the Elton R. Smith Endowment in Food and
Agricultural Policy, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University.
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Executive Summary
After much debate and many legislative proposals, the Clean Air Act was amended in
1990 to allow more flexibility in meeting emissions standards for SO2. Specifically, an SO2
emissions allowance trading program was implemented.  Firms can meet emission standards by
any pollution control method, including buying emission allowances from other firms. Analysts
have concluded that, with the changes in the Clean Air Act, SO2 emissions have been reduced by
50 percent and at an estimated $7 billion less than the anticipated cost of the regulatory
command-and-control system.
Not surprisingly, policy analysts have explored the opportunities for implementing
similar market-based systems for water pollution control.  Because much of the on-going
impairment of surface water has been attributed to nonpoint sources of pollution, trading
programs which incorporate both point and nonpoint discharges are of particular interest. 
However, despite as many as six efforts across the nation to implement point-nonpoint effluent
credit trading programs to reduce nutrient discharges to water, there have been few trades to
date.
This research was undertaken to answer the following question: Do current barriers to
effluent credit trading programs arise because of fundamental differences between air and water
media or because of differences between institutions affecting air and water use, such as the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act? 
Economic theory offers the situation, structure, conduct, and performance (SSCP)
framework, developed by industrial organization economists and extended by institutional and
environmental economists, within which to address this research question.  In the language of
the SSCP framework, the research question can be reframed as: are there fundamental
differences in the situation and structure of emission allowance markets and effluent credit
markets which result in conduct and performance differences?
A comparative analysis of situation and structure suggests that barriers to effective
nutrient discharge credit markets are not a result of fundamental differences in the air and water
media or the materials being discharged into air and water.  Rather, the barriers exist because of
structural differences % differences in institutional structure, program design and program
implementation.  Many of the structural barriers result from the Clean Water Act and its
implementation.  More flexibility in water pollution prevention would effectively remove many
of these barriers.
This research was supported, in part, by a grant from the Office of the Great Lakes,
Michigan Great Lakes Protection Fund and by the Elton R. Smith Endowment in Food and
Agricultural Policy, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University.ii
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and Watershed Effluent Markets: Lessons for Trading Program Design 
to Protect Great Lakes Water Quality
Patricia E. Norris, Elaine M. Brown and Sandra S. Batie
Introduction
The  regulatory command-and-control approach of the original federal Clean Air Act
produced environmental benefits but at a higher cost than might have been necessary under a
more flexible policy framework. After much debate and many legislative proposals, the Clean
Air Act was amended in 1990 to allow more flexibility in meeting emissions standards for SO2.
Specifically, an SO2 emissions allowance trading program was implemented.  Firms can meet
emission standards by any pollution control method, including buying emission allowances from
other firms. The history of this new market-based program of allowance trading is short. 
Nevertheless, analysts have concluded that, with the changes in the Clean Air Act, SO2 emissions
have been reduced by 50 percent and at an estimated $7 billion less than the anticipated cost of
the regulatory command-and-control system (Burtraw).
Not surprisingly, given the performance observed in the market for SO2 emissions
allowances, policy analysts have explored the opportunities for implementing similar market-
based systems for water pollution control.  Because much of the on-going impairment of surface
water has been attributed to nonpoint sources of pollution, trading programs which incorporate
both point and nonpoint discharges are of particular interest.  However, despite as many as six
efforts across the nation to implement point-nonpoint effluent credit trading programs to reduce
nutrient discharges to water, there have been few trades to date.
Several researchers have evaluated the recurring failure of effluent credit markets in
water quality policy, and some have developed criteria that a successful market would need to
satisfy (for example, see Letson; Hoag and Hughes-Popp; Apogee Research, Inc. 1992). Hoag
and Hughes-Popp concluded that, for a market in effluent credits to function, the following
conditions should be satisfied:
1. Low transaction costs to increase potential for trading
2. Sufficient number of point and nonpoint sources (not too many and not too few) to keep
transaction costs low2
3. Marginal abatement costs that differ between traders
4. Reasonable enforcement costs
5. Reasonable trading ratio to keep costs of trading low
6. Loadings must exceed regulation limits.
To develop this list, Hoag and Hughes-Popp reviewed a rich collection of literature on
economic theory of permit trading and case studies where trading has been proposed for water
pollution reduction.  However, a clear void in their work and in that of others is an explicit
comparison of successful air emission allowance trading programs to pilot watershed effluent
trading programs. To date, there has not been an attempt to use the SO2 emissions allowance
market as a laboratory from which to evaluate the potential for trading to reduce discharges to
water.  Specifically, the following research question has not been addressed: Do current barriers
to effluent credit trading programs arise because of fundamental differences between air and
water media or because of differences between institutions affecting air and water use, such as
the federal Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act?  Air and water quality programs, administered
by states with delegated authority, derive from these federal laws. This research was conducted
to answer this question and offer insights into how a state might develop a successful point-
nonpoint watershed effluent credit trading program.
Research Methods
Economic theory offers the situation, structure, conduct, and performance (SSCP)
framework, developed by industrial organization economists and extended by institutional and
environmental economists (Marion and Mueller; Schmid; Ostrom; Thomson), within which to
address this research question.  In the language of the SSCP framework, the research question
can be reframed as: are there fundamental differences in the situation and structure of emission
allowance markets and effluent credit markets which result in conduct and performance
differences?  More importantly for policy design, can lessons be learned from the evaluation of
situation, structure and conduct in the emission allowance market and applied to design of a
functioning market for effluent credits with the desired performance? 
Since the research question requires us to analyze the situation, structure, conduct and
performance of two different markets % a market for air emission allowances and a market for3
watershed effluent credits % the comparative analytics of synectics can be used to test for
similarities between the two markets.   In this application, the synectic process forces us to
abandon the standard process of simply comparing the functioning (or lack thereof) of two
market systems and to focus, instead, on the situations and structures that define the markets. 
The extent of similarities and differences in situation and structure can be expected to illuminate
the potential for similar market conduct, with the potential to offer similar market performance %
a reduction in pollutant discharges at a reduced control cost.  
Situation, Structure, Conduct and Performance
The situation, structure, conduct and performance (SSCP) analytical framework enables
an explicit look at why and how markets function (Marion and Mueller; Schmid; Ostrom;
Thomson; Thompson, Matthews and van Ravenswaay).  In the analysis of a functioning market,
situation refers to the characteristics of the goods and services being traded that create
interdependencies between traders. For example, the extent to which use of a resource by one
individual is affected by or precludes use by others, the transaction costs associated with use of
the resource, or the information costs associated with use of the resource are situations which
arise because of the physical nature of the resource. Situation also refers to the characteristics of
those doing the trading, for example the number or size of potential traders and their preferences
or objectives (Schmid; Thompson, Matthews and van Ravenswaay).
Structure refers to the institutions that empower different interests within a market
system and between markets and alternative regulatory systems. The institutional economics
literature offers an array of definitions of institutions.  Generally, institutions are the sets of
rights and obligations affecting people in their economic lives (Matthews).  More specifically,
references to institutions include
"...those legal, political and administrative structures and processes through which
decisions are made with respect to public policy.  These structures and processes
consist of laws and regulations that govern the distribution of benefits and costs
and set the ground rules for conflict resolution (Ingram et al.)." 
Schmid describes structure as that which determines who has the opportunity to participate in
resource-use decisions and how that opportunity is enabled and constrained. The institutional4
structure within which a market functions selects whose preferences or expectations will count. 
Structure is chosen, while situation is inherent.
Conduct is how buyers and sellers behave in a market.  That behavior reflects the
opportunity sets arising from the institutional structure chosen.  The way in which participants in
a market conduct themselves, in turn, determines the performance of the market (Thompson,
Matthews and van Ravenswaay.).  In general, the performance indicator used reflects the
interests of various stakeholders, which may include reductions in discharges, costs of pollution
control, or how the costs are distributed.
This framework provides an opportunity to evaluate and project the experience of
existing markets for air emission reduction credits. In this case, situation refers to the physical
environment within which the trading program is designed, including the characteristics of the
air resource, the dynamics of air flows, and the characteristics of the emissions themselves.  It
also refers to the characteristics of those who are discharging to the air. Structure refers to
opportunities and constraints introduced by the Clean Air Act and other institutions affecting the
context within which pollution control and/or SO2 trading occurs. The pollution control
decisions made by SO2 emitters and the decision to participate in an SO2 trading program are the
conduct of interest here.  Research has shown that changes in the structure of the Clean Air Act
resulted in changes in pollution control technologies so that SO2 credits have not been traded as
widely as had been anticipated.  However, trades have occurred. It is this conduct % the
modifications to control technologies and the trading % that, ultimately, changed the performance
of clean air policies. In the case of air quality policy, we are interested in the extent to which
pollution reduction goals are achieved and the extent to which the costs of achieving those goals
are reduced.
Applying the SSCP framework to water quality policy and attempts to establish effluent
credit markets, we can describe the situation and structure similarly to the description for air
above.  For water quality policy, situation refers to the characteristics of the water resource, the
dynamics of hydrology, and the characteristics of the effluents discharged.  It also refers to those
who are discharging effluents % where they are located, how they are operating, and how those
operations affect water quality. Structure refers to institutions such as regulations imposed under
the Clean Water Act, the system of property rights in water that has come to be recognized under1 Critics of effluent credit markets cite too much uncertainty related to extreme storm
events and nonpoint controls as a reason why point-nonpoint trading will not protect water
quality sufficiently.  However, experiences with combined sewer overflows and other POTW
failures indicate that point source controls are not without their weather-related uncertainties
(Stephenson, Norris and Shabman).
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this law, as well as common, commercial, and contract law, and the interaction between federal
and state water quality programs.
Together with the World Resources Institute and Michigan State University, Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality examined the economic feasibility of effluent credit
trading in the Saginaw Bay watershed.  The 1997 study determined that environmental and
economic benefits could be gained from trades of nutrient credits between point and nonpoint
sources.
1 The study also concluded that the economic feasibility of nutrient reduction credit
trading is watershed dependent % factors critical to success, such as geophysical features,
meteorological conditions, land use patterns, distribution of discharges between point and
nonpoint sources, and economic growth, vary widely between watersheds (Batchelor). Similar
studies in other midwestern states provided similar findings (Faeth).
It is the conduct of potential market participants and performance of the effluent credit
markets themselves that have confounded policy makers and researchers to date.  In pilot
effluent credit trading programs, point and nonpoint source dischargers have not traded effluent
credits.  There is evidence that, as with air emission sources, some water programs have caused
point source dischargers to adopt new technologies, but there is little evidence that any control
cost reductions have been enabled by flexibility in technology choice.  In short, pilot effluent
credit markets have not performed in the way that program designers have hoped % to achieve
greater pollution control at lower total cost.
Synectics
Synectics is a research method based on combining the problem-stating and problem-
solving processes, whereby the process of comparison is used to force expression of a problem
in a new way (Gordon). The synectics approach is designed to promote the recognition of
analogous problems and refers broadly to the investigation of similarities.  Dunn pointed out that
"people frequently fail to recognize that what appears to be a new problem is really an old one in6
disguise, and that old problems may contain potential solutions for problems that appear to be
new."  The synectic approach applied for this research is the direct analogy mechanism described
by Gordon as "the actual comparison of parallel facts, knowledge or technology." Dunn, in turn,
described direct analogy as a process whereby the analyst "searches for similar relationships
among two or more problem situations."  
Situation % % The Air and Water Media
Within the SSCP framework, situation is the physical characterization of the resource
and the biogeochemical processes that occur within that media.  More specifically, the
biophysical characteristics of air and water as waste assimilating media (the sulfur dioxide
assimilative capacity of air and the nitrogen and phosphorus assimilative capacity of water)
describe the situation within which a discharge credit market functions.
The air resource is comprised of a mixture of gases that make up the atmosphere.  Air
quality and pollutant dispersion are determined by the physical characteristics of large air mass
movement, weather and climate conditions, and local air movement.  The water resource is
characterized by the hydrologic cycle and its role in the geochemical cycles of materials such as
sulfates and nitrates.  Water quality and assimilative capacity are influenced by water movement
and  temperature.
The term airshed is sometimes used when describing air management programs.  
However, airshed is not an accurate description since air does not flow in a single direction like
water. A watershed is an area of land in which all the precipitation that fall on the land flows to a
common outlet from which it enters a stream, lake, river, wetland or the ocean (Black, 1996). 
Unlike an airshed, the physical boundaries of a watershed can be delineated.
The physical characteristics of air and water (as well as the biogeochemical
characteristics of materials discharged) determine the behavior of materials discharged to these
media. Table 1 summarizes the behavior of sulfur dioxides in air and nitrogen and phosphorus in
water. (See Brown for a detailed discussion of the biophysical characteristics of air and water
and the sulfur, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles.)  The primary difference between the chemicals’
behavior in air and water relate to the physical characteristics of the resources.  Materials
discharged to the air will disperse over a wide area, while materials discharged to water will7
flow downstream.  Also, technological developments have made monitoring of ambient air
quality simpler and less costly than monitoring ambient water quality.  For both resources,
monitoring of discharges is relatively easy for stationary or point sources.  However, mobile
sources of discharges to air and nonpoint sources of discharge to water are more difficult to
monitor.
Structure % % Institutions in Air and Water Use
Air and water use are governed by a set of property rights, some explicit and some
implicit, that have evolved as pressures on the resources have changed and public interest in the
quality of the resources has grown.  Federal laws describe how some users of the resources must
limit discharges to both air and water.  These rights and regulations establish structure, as
defined within the SSCP framework.
Air
Limits on discharges to air were first implemented by state and local laws and
ordinances, in recognition of the health impacts of polluted air (Kupchella and Hyland; Boubel
et al.).  Specifically, non-domestic sources of discharges were required to limit discharges.  This
approach was captured in federal legislation in 1970, when the Clean Air Act required certain
industries to obtain licenses to discharge pollutants into the air. (The first federal air pollution
statute was enacted in 1955 % it provided support for research, training and technical assistance
and was administered by the Public Health Service.)  The Clean Air Act, then, established the
rights of these industrial sources to discharge, within limits.
Other pollutant sources are not subject to discharge limits.  These smaller sources
(individuals, vehicle drivers, and industries such as gravel pits, lawn care companies and
agriculture) are free to emit pollutants into the air without a license. This lack of regulation
occurs, in part, because the administrative, transaction and enforcement costs to permit these
sources are prohibitive (Dales; Stavins 1995)
The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments created procedures for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) to set national standards for air quality, required automobile
manufacturers to reduce automobile emissions, required use of best available control technology2 Affected units are dischargers subject to emission reduction requirements.
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(BACT) for new sources, regulated air toxics, and expanded federal enforcement authority.  The
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments substantially expanded the statute and added the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration program to protect high quality air that exceeds national standards
(McCarthy et al.).  The purpose of the Clean Air Act is to 1) protect and enhance the quality of
air to promote public health and welfare; 2) continue and enhance a national research and
development program to obtain prevention and control of pollution; 3) provide technical and
financial assistance to State and local governments as they develop and implement pollution
prevention and control programs; and 4) encourage the development of regional pollution
prevention and control programs (42 USC 7401).
The Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990, requires USEPA to set National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for pollutants that are found across the country (42 USC 7409).  These
standards are set for six air pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO2), particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide
(NO2), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3), and lead.  These are called criteria pollutants and
emissions limits are set for each.  Primary standards are established to protect public health,
while secondary standards protect welfare (e.g. environmental and property damage) (U.S.
EPA).  In addition, the 1990 amendments included, as a goal, the reduction of acid deposition %
specifically, the reduction of SO2 emissions to 10 million tons below 1980 levels by 2010 (42
USC 7651).  The reductions in SO2 may be met through an emission allocation transfer system
(i.e. an allowance trading program).
SO2 Allowance Trading
The SO2 allowance trading program authorized by Title IV of the Clean Air Act is
unique, detailed and complex. It involves complex calculations to determine the allocation of
allowances for each affected unit
2 listed for Phase I and Phase II of the program.  Since 70
percent of the total SO2 emissions in the United States come from electric utility emissions, the
allowance trading program targets those emitters.  Phase I (January 1, 1995 - December 31,
1999) is targeted at the largest fossil-fuel burning units (electricity generating power plants that
have more than 100 megawatts of capacity and are emitting  SO2 at a rate higher than 2.5 pounds9
per million BTUs of energy output). Phase I requires 263 burning units to reduce emissions to
2.5 pounds per million BTUs.  Phase II (begun January 1, 2000) will affect more than 2000 units
and require all units to reduce SO2 emissions to 1.2 pounds per million BTUs. Because affected
units affected by Phase II could opt-in to Phase I, 445 affected units were given allowances in
the program in 1995 (McLean; Kerr).
The structure for the SO2 allowance trading program is also established in Title IV of the
Clean Air Act. Each operator of an affected unit is given a permit that allows emissions up to the
allowance calculated and allocated by USEPA. (In 2000, USEPA allocated a maximum of 8.90
million allowances annually.) Each affected unit must be permitted under Section 408 in Title
IV of the Clean Air Act and, through that five-year permit, obtain allowances to cover actual
emissions for each year. The affected units are subject to the requirements of other titles of the
1990 Clean Air Act including demonstrating that each unit can meet primary or health-based
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), new source performance standards, and
Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions (McLean). Annual emissions in excess of
allowances will result in a fine of $2000 per ton of SO2 emissions over the permitted level and
deduction of that number of allowances for the next year. This fine does not limit the ability of
USEPA or a state or local permitting and regulatory authority to levy other fines authorized in
Title I of the Clean Air Act.
In addition to the allocated allowances, an operator of an affected unit may obtain SO2
allowances through three other sources. USEPA withholds 2.8 percent of the allowances from
the allocation process. Some are sold at $1500 per allowance in direct sales, and others are sold
at an annual auction on the Chicago Board of Trade. Title IV of the Clean Air Act also provides
for issuing bonus allowances for conservation and renewable energy efforts, using flue gas
desulfurization systems (e.g., scrubbers), and for early reduction credits (McLean). Finally,
operators of affected units (or anyone else) may buy and sell allowances from other allowance
holders. If an operator knows that actual unit emissions will be less than the allowances held,
than excess allowances may be sold, traded, or banked for future use. 
Since there is a cap on total emissions from all affected units that must reduce emissions
to meet the cap, there is a value and a market for allowances. Any person may buy an allowance
that an affected unit may choose to sell. In addition, as new affected units come on line after10
January 1, 2000, they need SO2 allowances to operate. These new affected units are not allocated
allowances like existing units. Rather, under Title IV of the Clean Air Act, they must obtain
allowances from any entity that holds them. 
Although USEPA administers the Clean Air Act, the primary implementation and
regulation of permitted sources is carried out by state and local governments.  The federal
government sets the standards and provides technical assistance and funding to state and local
government programs.  Each state, as part of its state implementation plan (SIP) must also
submit a plan describing how the state will implement the SO2 allowance trading program. 
Water
The federal government has the authority to enact legislation to regulate water based on
the commerce clause (Article 1, section 8, clause 3) of the United States Constitution, which
authorizes the federal government to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce
(Braddock).  The first legislation to protect water use, the Rivers and Harbors Act, was passed in
1899 and focused on preserving navigation.  Only in the past 50 years has Congress enacted
water quality protection legislation.
The initial response of the federal government to water quality problems was to enact
legislation to facilitate state activities to protect water quality.  In 1948, the Water Pollution
Control Act gave state and local governments technical assistance funds to promote activities to
protect water quality.  At that time, water pollution was viewed as a state and local government
problem so there were no federal goals and objectives, or even limits or guidelines.  The Water
Quality Act of 1965 made states responsible for setting water quality standards for interstate
navigable waters (Copeland 1999a).
The federal approach to water quality protection was changed with passage of the Clean
Water Act of 1972.  Approaches of previous laws were abandoned; the new law established a
federal program for protecting and restoring water quality.  The law established goals of
achieving fishable and swimmable water quality by 1983 and  eliminating discharges to the
nation’s waters by 1985.  The 1972 statute made it illegal to discharge a pollutant without a
permit, strengthened the water quality standards system, encouraged the use of best available
pollution control technology (BAT) that is economically achievable, and provided billions of11
dollars for construction of sewage treatment plants (Copeland 1999b). It also defined nonpoint
sources of water pollution and directed states to identify nonpoint problems and develop plans
for reducing nonpoint discharges.
The Clean Water Act is a technology-based statute that requires regulated sources to use
prescriptive technologies to control discharges. The concept of best practicable control
technology (BPT) is used primarily for controlling conventional pollutants such as suspended
solids, biochemical oxygen-demanding materials (e.g. phosphorus, nitrogen and organic matter),
fecal coliform and bacteria, and pH. Conventional pollutants are those that are naturally
occurring in the environment and that deplete the dissolved oxygen supply in the water.  In the
case of industrial sources after 1989, the Act requires greater than BPT pollution abatement. 
This higher technology standard is termed best available technology (BAT) that is economically
achievable.  The BAT control level focuses on toxic substances (Copeland 1999b).  Publicly-
owned treatment works (POTWs) are required to meet similarly high standards by installing
secondary treatment systems that break down organic pollutants and remove 80 to 90 percent of
the oxygen demand and suspended solids before discharge to the environment (Moore and
Moore).
A higher level of pollution control is required as technology improves to reduce
discharges into the water of the nation (Copeland 1999b).  For example some POTWs now have
tertiary treatment systems that chemically treat the effluent, reducing the oxygen demand of the
effluent by removing inorganic materials such as phosphorus and nitrogen, before it is
discharged.  This higher standard may be required for a POTW to expand in a watershed where
degraded waters are not currently meeting designated uses or to produce high quality waters for
use as a public water supply downstream (Moore and Moore).  While secondary treatment
removes up to 50 percent of total nitrogen and 30 percent of total phosphorous, tertiary treatment
can remove 90 to 95 percent of the phosphorus through precipitation techniques and up to 86
percent of the nitrogen through a denitrification process (Manahan).
The permitting of discharges into the waters of the nation is implemented through the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).  Nationwide, some 65,000
industrial and municipal (i.e. publicly-owned treatment works) dischargers must obtain permits. 
Nonpoint sources are not subject to the NPDES permitting requirements. NPDES permits3 Effluent limitations are restrictions established by USEPA on the quantities, rates and
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological or other constituents discharged from a point
source.
4 MDEQ administrative rule 323.1060.
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include the control technology to apply to each pollutant, the effluent limitation
3 a source must
meet and the deadline for compliance.  With approval from USEPA, states may administer the
NPDES program under state law. As of January 1999, 43 states have been delegated authority to
administer the NPDES permit program.  USEPA issues permits for the remaining seven states.
Regulatory Requirements for Nitrogen and Phosphorus Discharges
USEPA considers nitrogen and phosphorus to be pollutants that may need to be regulated
to protect water quality (U.S. EPA 1998a).  These plant nutrients are the focus of proposed new
water quality criteria that would be used for determining if water bodies meet designated uses
and for Total Maximum Daily Load Determinations (U.S. EPA 1998b).  Nitrate nitrogen has an
ambient standard of 10 mg/l to protect drinking water supplies.  There is no ambient standard for
inorganic phosphorus to protect water quality.  Some states have established discharge standards
for N and P.  For example, in Michigan the total P standard is 1 mg/l maximum monthly average
for the effluent discharge.
4  For nitrogen, the discharge limit for nitrates is addressed through an
un-ionized ammonia criterion of 320 )g/l for cold water and 420 )g/l for warm water resources
(Heaton). Generally, nonpoint sources of nitrogen and phosphorus are not subject to these limits.
Nitrogen and Phosphorus Discharge Credit Trading
There is no federal statutory authority to implement nitrogen or phosphorus discharge
credit trading programs.  USEPA has approved trading principles for specific water pollution
problems on a limited basis (Jarvie and Solomon 1998).  In 1996, USEPA issued the Effluent
Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement (U.S. EPA 1996b) and the Draft Framework for
Watershed-based Trading (U.S. EPA 1996a). The policy statement supports trading within the
regulatory context of the Clean Water Act. In lieu of federal regulations for nutrient discharge13
trading, the USEPA framework has identified eight principles for effluent or nutrient trading
(U.S. EPA 1996a). They are:
1. Trading participants must meet the minimum applicable Clean Water Act (CWA)
technology-based standards.
2. Trades must be consistent with water quality standards throughout the watershed as well
as meet the requirements of the CWA, other federal and state laws, and local ordinances.
3. Trades are developed within a TMDL or other equivalent analytical and management
framework.
4. Trades must occur within the current regulatory and enforcement mechanisms.
5. Trading boundaries generally coincide with watershed or water body segment
boundaries, and trading areas are a manageable size.
6. Trading will generally add to existing ambient monitoring.
7. Careful consideration is given to types of pollutants traded.
8. Stakeholder involvement and public participation are key components of trading.
Several states are in the process of developing, or have developed, rules to establish state
nutrient discharge trading programs.  Since these programs complement existing point source
regulatory programs, they may use existing compliance requirements and enforcement actions
(Jarvie and Solomon).
Comparing Structural Components
The environmental economics literature has, over time, developed a list of institutional,
design and implementation components % structural components % that are essential for a
successful market incentive-based trading program.  The institutional components include:
￿ clearly defined property rights (including the rights, liability and responsibilities of the
participating parties) (Schmid; Dales)
￿ an institutional framework that supports implementation of the program (Stavins 1995;
Stavins 1997; Apogee Research, Inc. 1992)5 While the regulatory community tends to use the term incentive to mean financial
incentives such as subsidies, economists use the term to refer to things that cause people to take
specific actions.  For example, in this context, financial incentive means there is some financial
benefit for pollution prevention, either from the ability to seek a lower cost control technique or
the ability to purchase discharge credits at a cost lower than control costs. An example of a
regulatory incentive would be a penalty associated with violating a discharge performance
standard.
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￿ clear choice of an open or closed trading system (closed trading programs operate with a
cap on total emissions while open programs do not) (Faeth)
￿ program goals (Solomon)
￿ internal flexibility (ability to make internal operations changes) and external flexibility
(ability to select from among alternatives for reaching the performance goal) for
participants (Tietenberg 1990; Stephenson, Shabman and Geyer), and
￿ opportunities to respond to financial incentives
5 for pollution prevention (Stephenson,
Shabman and Geyer).
Design components include:
￿ a standard unit of the pollutant to trade (Tietenberg 1990)
￿ reasonable trading ratios (Hoag and Hughes-Popp)
￿ opt-in provisions (Environmental Law Institute; McLean), and
￿ banking (ability to purchase or save credits for future use or sale) (Tietenberg 1998;
Stavins 1997)
Finally, implementation components include:
￿ low initial transaction costs (among trading parties with limited government regulation of
the transaction) (Solomon)
￿ low information costs (ease of finding trading partners and other information necessary
to trade) (Stavins 1997), and
￿ low monitoring and enforcement costs (Hoag and Hughes-Popp)
Table 2 compares the SO2 allowance trading and nutrient discharge credit trading
structures to these key structural components.  While there are economic incentives for nutrient
discharge credit trading (nonpoint controls can be implemented at lower cost than point source6 NOx and SOx are shorthand terms to denote more than one form of the compound, e.g.
NO2 and NO3.
7 These credits would be comparable to a nonpoint source credits, if such credits existed
in water quality trading programs.
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controls), there are also disincentives built into the structure.  That property rights are not clearly
defined for nonpoint sources while they are clearly defined for point sources is problematic. As
one example, that a point source who trades nutrient discharge credits with a nonpoint source
must modify its NPDES permit and also remains liable for possible nonpoint discharges results
in both legal uncertainty and high transaction costs.  That USEPA has provided nutrient trading
guidelines rather than rules means that nutrient credit trading programs lack some structural
components that are key.  Further, the lack of compliance flexibility for potential nutrient
discharge credit traders limits the incentives for trading. (For a complete description of the
material summarized in table 2, see Brown.)
The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in the Los Angeles area is an
example of a regional program modeled after the federal SO2 allowance trading program. 
RECLAIM addresses NOx and SOx emissions
6 from stationary sources through a market for
RECLAIM Trading Credits % emissions credits that are allocated to participating facilities
annually (Luong, Tsai and Sarkar).  The program was adopted in 1993.  Each facility with
emission restrictions is issued an annually declining allocation of emission credits.  RECLAIM
credits may be bought or sold as the facilities deem appropriate.  Facilities may also use
emissions reduction credits generated by stationary sources not in the program and mobile
source emission reduction credits
7 (SCAQMD).
Market structure in the RECLAIM program is compared to structure in four regional
nutrient credit trading programs in table 3. The structures of these four water quality programs,
developed within the framework provided by USEPA, are described briefly.
￿ Tar-Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Trading Program, North Carolina
Initiated in September 1989 in response to excess nutrients in the Tar-Pamlico
River system, the Tar-Pamlico River Basin program set a nutrient loading goal. 
Based on modeling results, points sources who chose to participate in the trading16
program became members of the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association.  The
Association as a whole, rather than individual members, was given a nutrient
loading limit.  Membership in the association afforded members the opportunity
to reallocate load among themselves, if necessary, to meet the limit. If the
association exceeded the loading limit, it would be required to pay into a fund
that would be used to pay for controls of nonpoint sources (Green). 
￿ Dillon Reservoir Program, Colorado
In 1982, the state of Colorado established an ambient water quality standard for
phosphorus in the Dillon Reservoir. Individual discharge limits and the rules for
phosphorus discharge credit trading were established in 1984. A 2:1 trading ratio
was set; trades had to be approved by the state water quality agency and included
in the point source NPDES permits.  However, trading opportunities were made
contingent upon local governments in Summit County adopting regulations that
required best management practices or other methods of pho9sphorus control for
all new nonpoint sources (CDPHE, 1997).
￿ Cherry Creek Program, Colorado
The Colorado Water Quality Control Commission established a phosphorus
standard for the Cherry Creek Reservoir in 1984. The total annual phosphorus
load for point and nonpoint sources was set, and allocations were assigned to all
point sources dischargers based on the observed nonpoint discharges.  Point
sources could purchase discharge credits from nonpoint sources only after total
nonpoint discharges were reduced by 50 percent. The Cherry Creek Basin
Authority must approve all trades, subject to case-by-case trading ratios, and the
NPDES permits of the point sources must be amended to reflect the trade
(CDPHE, 1998).
￿ Lower Minnesota River Program, Minnesota.
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency established a limit for chemical
biological oxygen demand for the last 25 miles of the Minnesota River in 1988. 
The load was fully allocated among point sources in the reach and upstream17
loadings.  State guidelines for effluent trading specify that trades substitute
nonpoint source load reductions for point source load requirements of a
discharger who holds an NPDES permit (Senjem).
A complete description of the situation and structure of each of these programs is provided in
Brown.
There are important differences in market structure for RECLAIM and the four water
quality programs. Although property rights are defined, nonpoint sources of nutrient discharges
are not regulated as point sources are.  This limits the incentive for nonpoint sources to
participate. With the exception of the Tar-Pamlico program, the lack of compliance flexibility
and economic incentives for participation limits the effectiveness of the market.  In the nutrient
credit trading programs, uncertainties associated with nonpoint discharges result in uncertainties
about trading ratios; potential traders are required to negotiate trading ratios based on their
individual situations.  Transaction and information costs are quite high in the water quality
programs, especially in terms of potential trades between point and nonpoint sources of
discharge.
Conduct % % How Buyers and Sellers Respond
Conduct is how buyers and sellers behave in a market. In the context of emissions
allowance trading and discharge credit trading, the conduct of interest is whether dischargers
have modified their control technologies and/or traded allowances or credits. The information in
tables 4a and 4b summarizes the number of transfers or trades of SO2 allowances that occurred
during the 1994-2000 period.  The number of trades is smaller than initially was anticipated,
largely because the flexibility afforded by the Clean Air Act amendments has enabled
dischargers to adopt lower-cost control technologies to meet allowed emission levels.
As of 1999, 370 facilities were participating in the RECLAIM program. These facilities
have actively traded RECLAIM credits and have installed emissions reduction technologies
(Luong, Tsai and Sarkar). During the 1998 year, 441 RECLAIM credit transactions were
recorded; 541 transactions occurred during the 1999 year.
An analysis of market conduct in the four nutrient discharge credit trading programs
reveals little market activity (Brown). 18
￿ In the Tar-Pamlico program, point sources met the nutrient reduction goals through
technological changes and by re-allocating discharge levels among themselves. Because
the load limit has never been exceeded, the Association members have not looked to
discharge credit trading with nonpoint sources for assistance.  
￿ Point sources in the Dillon Reservoir watershed have met their loading allocations
through increased operating efficiency and have not traded discharge credits with
nonpoint sources. 
￿ In the Cherry Creek program, point and nonpoint sources must meet discharge limits
before credits can be generated.  To date, these limits have not been met and no credits
have been traded. 
￿ Only in the Minnesota River Program has there been trading of discharge credits. The
Rahr Malting Company, a point source that wished to construct its own wastewater
treatment plant, implemented nonpoint phosphorus reductions upstream in exchange for
its permitted Chemical Biological Oxygen Demand increases. The company has trading
agreements with at least four upstream landowners; the offsets generated by these trades
are included in the company’s NPDES permit, as well as requirements for monitoring the
maintenance of the nonpoint source controls.
Performance % % Environmental Quality and Program Costs
Numerous studies on the economic benefits and environmental impacts of SO2 allowance
trading have been conducted (Burtraw 1996; Burtraw 1998; Bohi and Burtraw; McLean). A
1996 U.S. Geological Survey report indicated that, between 1994 and 1995, ambient
concentrations of SO2 declined by 17 percent nationally (Lynch, Bowersox and Grimm).
Burtraw (1998) reviewed studies of economic benefits and concluded that the allowance trading
program reduced pollution control costs by $780 million annually (in 1995 dollars) as compared
to the cost of the traditional command-and-control programs.  The economic benefits to the
utility companies that are required to participate are the result of several factors.  With allowance
trading, participants have flexibility in determining how they will use allowances to cover their
SO2 emissions.  In addition, participants are given flexibility to determine how they will meet
their emissions reduction requirements and are able to choose the least-cost option.  19
Performance in the RECLAIM program can be illustrated by reductions in emissions and
the costs of RECLAIM credits traded. Actual emissions were below aggregate allocations of
emissions each year from 1994 through 1998. These emissions reductions occurred at a lower
cost than was projected for the command-and-control approach (Luong, Tsai and Sarkar).
In the nutrient discharge credit trading programs, initiation of the load reduction
requirements and specific program requirements have led point sources to reduce discharges in
the Tar-Pamlico and Dillon watersheds. In the Tar-Pamlico watershed, the point source members
of the Association met their load reductions through increased operating efficiency and re-
allocating the load among themselves.  The members have not exceeded their load limit, which
would open the opportunity for trading. Estimates suggest that the point sources met their
performance goals for reduced discharges at one-seventh of the cost what would have been
observed if a more restrictive approach had been pursued (Green).
In the Dillon Reservoir, increasing operating efficiencies allowed point sources to reduce
their phosphorus loading by 85 percent between 1981 and 1991.  The improved operating
efficiency reduced phosphorus loading to the reservoir at lower costs to the point sources than
would have been the case with a full upgrade. Because point sources remain below their loading
allocation, there has been no incentive to trade with nonpoint sources (Zander).
In the Cherry Creek Basin, the opportunity to trade discharge credits is not available until
point and nonpoint sources meet the phosphorus load reductions assigned to them in 1984. 
Neither point nor nonpoint sources have met those load reductions, and the deadline to do so has
been extended several times (CDPHE, 1998; Apogee Research, Inc.).
Only in the Minnesota River program have there been discharge credits traded. The
economic and environmental benefits arising from those trades have not been reported (Brown).20
Conclusions 
There are clear differences in the conduct and performance of existing air emission
allowance and nutrient discharge credit markets.  Comparing situation and structure, it appears
that current difficulties with water quality trading program design do not arise because of
fundamental differences between the air and water media (situation).  Rather, the difficulties
arise because of structure issues.  The lack of flexibility for participants, few economic
incentives for participation, and high transaction costs are barriers to effective markets for
nutrient discharge credits. In addition, attempts to incorporate point and nonpoint source
dischargers into trading programs have been limited because of differences in property rights of
point and nonpoint sources. These differences in structure give rise to differences in conduct,
which, in turn, affect market performance. This research suggests that changes in the Clean
Water Act are needed to reduce the structural barriers % barriers that have been effectively
eliminated in the Clean Air Act.  However, it is clear that modifications to the Clean Water Act
are not likely in the future.  As such, an alternative conclusion from this research is that effective
control of nonpoint sources of nutrient discharges may require consideration of alternative
innovative policy approaches that can be implemented within the current legal framework.  21
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Complex cycling yes yes yes
Dispersion in media wide area downstream downstream


















Table 2.  Comparing SO2 allowance trading structure and nutrient discharge credit trading
structure to essential structural components. 





￿ Property rights 
￿ Institutional
framework




Clearly defined for affected units
Clearly defined for affected units
Closed system with emission limit
Lower SO2 by 10 million tons
Internal and external
Yes
Clearly defined for point
sources; not for nonpoint
sources
Open system with effluent limit
Water quality standards
No






One ton SO2 = one allowance
No
Yes, for defined sources










Minimal; new rules of exchange
Limited because of registry
Lower than command/control
Low because of transparency
High; modify NPDES permits
High; hard to find partners
High; check point and nonpoint
High; check point and nonpoint
Source: Brown 200028
Table 3.  Comparison of RECLAIM market structure and nutrient credit trading program structures to essential structural components.
Essential
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Yes, case by case
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1  Though property rights and institutional structure are defined in each case, the property rights of point sources and nonpoint
sources of nutrient discharge are different.
2 TMDL is Total Maximum Daily Load; CBOD is Chemical Biological Oxygen Demand.30






































































































Source: U.S. EPA, Clean Air Market Programs31







































































































Source: U.S. EPA, Clean Air Market Program